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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
IS ENTITLED TO A SPECIFIC JURY INSTRUCTION
WHEN SUPPORTING EVIDENCE EXISTS:
STATE V. ARIAS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Arias, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the
question of when a criminal defendant is entitled to a specific jury
instruction.' The court held that in a criminal trial, the court must instruct
the jury on every theory of the case which is supported by sufficient
evidence. 2 In other words, a jury instruction on a specific theory is proper
when "the evidence is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds
of the fact finder." 3 Additionally, in deciding whether a particular in-4
struction is warranted, the trial court must not weigh the evidence.
Further, failure to give such an instruction which is supported by the
evidence cannot be deemed a harmless error.' State v. Arias has clarified
the jury instruction test after an uncertain and ambiguous history. This
Note examines the history of the test and the reasoning by the Arias
court in adopting the new test.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Rito Antonio Arias (Defendant) was a passenger in Vincent Vasquez's
(Vasquez) automobile. 6 The two were parked outside their girlfriends'
home waiting for the women. Next door a party was going on. Two
men, David Wages (Wages) and Eddie Franco (Franco), walked out from
the party and approached the Defendant's automobile. Franco and Vasquez had previously met. An argument ensued between Franco and
Vasquez.
Defendant and Vasquez got out of the automobile. Vasquez and Wages
began arguing. Vasquez punched Wages in the face. After the attack,
Wages and Franco went back into the party to get weapons. Meanwhile,
Vasquez got a rifle out of the car.
At this point, the victim, Mike McKee (McKee), left the party to see
what was happening outside. McKee was unarmed. McKee and Vasquez
spoke. Vasquez then took the rifle and pointed it between McKee's eyes.
McKee pushed the rifle aside and shoved Vasquez. Vasquez gave the
rifle to Defendant and began a physical fight with McKee. During the

1. 115 N.M. 93, 847 P.2d 327 (Ct. App. 1993).
2. Id. at 95, 847 P.2d at 329.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 97, 847 P.2d at 331.
5. Id. at 97-98, 847 P.2d at 331-32.
6. Id. at 94, 847 P.2d at 328. Unless noted, all subsequent facts refer to this cite.
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fight, Franco, and another party guest, Mendoza, exited the party carrying
boards. They approached the two men who were fighting.
The testimony at trial from this point on conflicted. Franco and
Mendoza testified that Defendant fired the first shot at them as they
approached the brawl. Defendant testified he initially fired the rifle at
Vasquez and McKee. Defendant further testified that he fired a second
time at Franco and Mendoza because he believed Franco and Mendoza
were going to attack him; Defendant believed he was in fear for his life.
After the first shot McKee began to retreat into the party. Mendoza
testified that Defendant fired the second shot at McKee while McKee
was running away. Defendant testified he did not intend to shoot anyone,
and in fact, he did not realize anyone had been shot. 7 Defendant, however,
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the death of McKee. 8
Defendant appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred in not
instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter under Defendant's proffered "imperfect self-defense" theory.9 The court of appeals reversed
Defendant's voluntary manslaughter conviction, holding that Defendant's
requested instruction should have been submitted to the jury based on
the evidence at trial. 0
III.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE ISSUE

The history of the criminal jury instruction test in New Mexico has
been tumultuous and vague. New Mexico courts have continuously struggled to determine what threshold of evidence must be met in order to
send a particular instruction to the jury. The early cases outlined a
minimal threshold standard which cases in the middle period modified.
Later, modern case law took a stricter and more rigorous approach to
the sufficient evidence requirement to obtain a particular jury instruction.
Arias represents a return to a lower standard.
A.

The Early Cases: A Minimal Standard
Early New Mexico cases required the trial court to give jury instructions
whenever a defendant offered "any evidence to support a given theory.""
In Territory v. Watson, the defendant was indicted for assault with a
loaded pistol, with intent to murder. 2 The New Mexico Supreme Court
held that there was evidence tending to support the defendant's imperfect
self-defense theory. 3 Even though the court acknowledged it had "grave

7. Id. at 95, 847 P.2d at 329.
8. Id. at 93, 847 P.2d at 327. Defendant was also convicted of criminal trespass, shooting at
an inhabited dwelling and tampering with evidence. Defendant appealed only the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. State v. Branchal, 101 N.M. 498, 500, 684 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101
N.M. 419, 683 P.2d 1341 (1984).
12. 12 N.M. 419, 78 P. 504 (1904).

13. Id. at 421, 78 P. at 505.
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doubts" about whether or not the defendant actually acted in self-defense,
the court held the defendant was entitled to the instruction
because some
14
pertinent evidence in the case had been presented.
In another early case, State v. Martinez, the defendant was charged
with murder and was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 5 The
defendant, a married woman, claimed that the victim had made repeated
advances towards her and that she had killed him in self-defense. 6 There
were no witnesses to the murder. On appeal, the defendant alleged that
the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury upon all theories
of law. 17 In particular, where there were several elements of justification,
the defendant argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury
as to each element.' The supreme court held that a defendant in a
criminal case was entitled to have instructions given upon every material
issue raised by the evidence presented, if there was any competent evidence
reasonably tending to substantiate that material issue.19 Based solely on
the defendant's testimony as to how the events transpired between the
victim and herself, the court reversed the defendant's conviction and2
remanded the case for a new trial with the proper jury instructions. 0
Thus, early New Mexico cases required only a minimal threshold of
evidence for the defendant to obtain a desired jury instruction, even
based solely on the defendant's testimony.
B.

The Middle Era: The Minimal Standard Revisited
In cases following the early period, New Mexico courts raised the
evidentiary threshold necessary to obtain a jury instruction, but the
augmented requirement was barely evident. The new test referred to
"substantial evidence though slight" as entitling a criminal defendant to
2
an instruction on a particular theory. '
. Typical of middle period rulings in New Mexico, State v. Heisler
effectively took the fairly low standard of the early period, but applied
it more harshly. 2 The defendant was convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to death. 23 The victim picked up the defendant while the

14. Id. at 421-22, 78 P. at 505.
15. 30 N.M. 179, 230 P. 379 (1924).
16. Id. at 180, 230 P. at 380.
17. Id. at 181, 230 P. at 381.
18. Id. at 183, 230 P. at 382.
19. Id. at 183-84, 230 P. at 383-84.
20. Id.
21. State v. Branchal, 101 N.M. 498, 500, 684 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Ct. App.) (citing State v. Jones,
52 N.M. 235, 195 P.2d 1020 (1948)), cert. denied (1984).
22. 58 N.M. 446, 272 P.2d 660 (1954). The court in Heisler quoted with approval from Walker
v. State:
It is the law in most jurisdictions that if there isevidence appearing in the record
which would raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the homicide with which the
defendant is charged was committed in self-defense, it is the duty of the trial court
to instruct upon that issue ... and a failure to so instruct is error.
Id. at 454, 272 P.2d at 665 (quoting Walker v. State, 83 P.2d 994, 994 (Ariz. 1938)).
23. Id. at 446, 272 P.2d at 660.
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defendant was hitchhiking. On the second night the two were together,
they stopped to sleep. The defendant claimed he caught the victim going
through defendant's suitcase. A fight broke out, at which time the victim
began to strangle the defendant. The defendant grabbed a gun and fired
several shots at the victim. 24
On appeal the supreme court affirmed the conviction, holding that the
defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense. 25 However,
the victim had a large advantage over the defendant and the medical
evidence could have shown self-defense. Nevertheless, based on the defendant's own testimony in which he stated that the victim threatened
him, that he, the defendant, had possession of the gun at all times and
that the defendant took the deceased's money and watch, the court found
the evidence was not sufficient to tender a self-defense instruction.
The middle era cases like Heisler raised the threshold of evidence
needed by a criminal defendant from any evidence to a substantialevidence
test, however slightly met. By adopting this new test, the court made it
somewhat more difficult for a defendant to get a requested jury instruction. In the pre-Arias modern cases, however, New Mexico criminal
defendants would find it considerably more difficult to obtain such
requested instructions in similar cases.
C. The Modern Cases: The Ambiguous Period
In the 1980s, the jury instruction test in New Mexico became confusing
and convoluted. The court formulated a number of different tests for
determining the appropriate threshold of evidence required for a requested
jury instruction. First, in State v. Martinez, the court articulated the
standard by requiring evidence "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
in the minds of the jury" to warrant an instruction. 26 In that case, the
defendant was convicted of felony murder. 27 The crime was committed
in an auto sales shop where the victim was employed. The defendant
requested voluntary manslaughter and self-defense jury instructions but
the court denied the request, even though the record reflected evidence
that a struggle had taken place. Both the victim and defendant were
wounded and both suffered gun shot wounds. The supreme court held,
however, that this evidence was also consistent with the State's theory
of the case, and affirmed the defendant's conviction.n Thus, despite the
standard of "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jury," the court actually weighed the credibility of both parties and
decided whose story was most believable, taking the fact finding function
away from the jury.

24. Id.
25. Heisler, 58 N.M. at 448, 272 P.2d at 661.
26. 95 N.M. 421, 423, 622 P.2d 1041, 1043 (1981) (citing State v. Cochran, 78 N.M. 292, 430
P.2d 863 (1967)).
27. 95 N.M. at 422, 622 P.2d at 1042.
28. Id. at 423, 662 P.2d at 1043.
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On the other hand, State v. Chavez indicated that the standard required
evidence to support a finding by the jury in favor of defendant on all
elements of self-defense. 29 In Chavez, the defendant and a companion
entered a convenience store.30 The defendant threatened the store clerk
with a knife and then proceeded to fight with a customer in the store
who was ultimately killed by the defendant. 3 According to the defendant,
the customer had his own knife which he brandished. The defendant
asked for a self-defense instruction which the court refused, citing the
lack of any self-defense evidence other than the defendant's own testi32
mony. The court of appeals upheld the defendant's conviction.
In 1984, the court of appeals redefined the test in State v. Branchal.33
In that case, the defendant was once again denied a self-defense jury
instruction which the higher court upheld.3 The test defined in Branchal
required an instruction "whenever a defendant presents evidence sufficient
to allow reasonable minds to differ as to all elements of the defense." 3 5
Despite the developments in the last decade, the threshold requirement
as to what was sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction has
remained clouded. For example, a recent case held that an instruction
should be given when there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction
on the charge,3 6 while another case maintained that an instruction should
be given when it is merely "raised and supported by the evidence." ' 37 In
State v. Arias, the court has once again attempted to clarify what the
threshold of evidence must be to get an instruction submitted to the jury
in a criminal case.
D. The Arias Rationale: Looking to Californiafor Guidance
As discussed above, the evolution of the jury instruction standard in
New Mexico was ambiguous and uncertain. The Arias court looked to
two California cases for guidance." The court found the California
rationale persuasive because of its "virtually identical involuntary manslaughter statutes ' 39 to New Mexico and because both New Mexico and
California adhere to the legal principle that "a defendant is entitled to
a jury instruction on his theory of the case as long as there is sufficient
evidence to support it." ° With this second proposition in mind, the New

29. 99 N.M. 609, 611, 661 P.2d 887, 889 (1983).
30. Id. at 610, 661 P.2d at 888.
31. Id. at 611, 661 P.2d at 889.
32. Id. at 610, 661 P.2d at 888.
33. 101 N.M. 498, 684 P.2d 1163 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 419, 683 P.2d 1341 (1984).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 500, 684 P.2d at 1165.
36. See State v. Benavidez, 94 N.M. 706, 616 P.2d 419 (1980).
37. See State v. Privett, 104 N.M. 79, 81, 717 P.2d 55, 57 (1986).
38. State v. Arias, 115 N.M. 93, 96, 847 P.2d 327, 330 (citing People v. Glenn, 280 Cal. Rptr.
609 (Ct. App. 1991), People v. Welch, 187 Cal. Rptr. 511 (Ct. App. 1982)).
39. Arias, 115 N.M. at 97, 847 P.2d at 331 (comparing CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West 1988)
and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984)).
40. Arias, 115 N.M. at 97, 847 P.2d at 331.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

Mexico court looked again to California to determine what constitutes
sufficient evidence.
In People v. Glenn, the defendant and the victim were having breakfast
in a restaurant. 4' The defendant was in possession of a large knife, one
he claims was too big to put in his pocket. The defendant and victim
finished eating and the victim left a tip on the counter. Defendant picked
it up. An argument erupted between the two. The defendant testified
that as he walked away he heard the victim coming up behind him and
he stabbed the victim. The prosecution alleged that the defendant intended
to kill the victim. 42
At trial, the court denied the defendant's request for an involuntary
manslaughter jury instruction. 43 The court stated there was lack of sufficient evidence to support such an instruction. On appeal, the Glenn
court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that even though the
defendant's own testimony was conflicting as to the different theories,
the court had a duty to instruct the jury on all theories substantially
supported by the evidence. 44
The facts in People v. Welch are similar to those in Glenn.41 In Welch,
the defendant and the victim were arguing in a bar." The defendant was
taking a blood thinner, and fearing an attack by the victim who was
testified
lunging at him, the defendant shot the victim. The defendant
47
attack.
the
stop
just
victim;
the
shoot
to
he did not intend
The Welch court held that the defendant had, in fact, introduced
sufficient evidence to support an involuntary manslaughter jury instruction." Based on the defendant's own testimony and the substantiating
facts which went along with this testimony, the California Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction because of the failure to
give the requested jury instruction, and remanded to case for a new

trial .49
IV.

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS

By adopting the new test set forth in State v. Arias, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals has found a middle ground in the amount of evidence
required before a proper jury instruction is submitted to the jury. The
Arias decision has determined the standard of evidence that a criminal
defendant must meet in order to get certain instructions submitted to
the jury to be that of sufficient evidence. A specific jury instruction
meets the sufficient evidence requirement whenever "a defendant presents

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Glenn, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
Id. at 611.
Id.at 610.
Id.at 611.
Welch, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 512-13.
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 512.
Id.
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evidence which is sufficient to allow reasonable minds to differ with
respect to all the elements of the defense." 50
Essentially, the Arias standard allows submission to a jury of any
instruction which is substantiated in court. A bare testimonial by the
defendant would be inadequate.5 But, if that testimony can be substantiated through other testimony, past conduct of the parties, or a reasonable
and competent explanation by the defendant himself which is enough to
raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the fact finder, the sufficiency
standard is met.5 2 Thus, the trial court must submit an instruction based
on this evidence.
The new test adopted in Arias appears to provide a fair and equitable
result. Any standard other than the "reasonable doubt" evidence test
would likely result in extreme hardship to criminal defendants. Furthermore, the courts might be burdened with time-consuming instructions to
the jury and lengthy jury deliberations, or appeals based on violations
of the defendant's constitutional rights. 5a
A.

The Reasonable Doubt Standard: A Fair and Equitable Approach
A trial court must instruct the jury on every theory of the case which
is supported by sufficient and competent evidence.5 4 The evidence is said
to be sufficient when it is capable of raising a reasonable doubt in the
minds of the fact finder concerning the defendant's theory of the case."
In deciding whether to instruct the jury on a particular theory the trial
court must not weigh the credibility of the witness.5 6 That task should
be left solely to the jury.57 Even if the evidence does not spur belief,
the trial court is not authorized to refuse the tendered instruction.58 To
the contrary, if the evidence is minimal and cannot be substantiated in
any way, the trial court may disregard the requested instruction. 9 The
Glenn court, for example, cited People v. Ibarra,60 which held that a
bare testimonial by the defendant was not substantiated enough to warrant
a sua sponte instruction on that theory of the case. 6' The Ibarra court
reasoned where a single piece of evidence supporting a defendant's theory
was a "one-line explanation," but the defendant's own version of events,
taken together with all the other evidence, only implied a particular
theory, no instruction should be given. 62 The Glenn court noted, however,

50. Arias, 115 N.M. at 95, 847 P.2d at 329.
51. See Glenn, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
52. Id.
53. Further, the failure to give an instruction which is founded in substantial evidence will result
in automatic error. Arias, 115 N.M. at 97-98, 847 P.2d at 331-32.
54. Id. at 97, 847 P.2d at 331.
55. Id. at 329.
56. Glenn, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 184 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1982).
61. Id. at 643.
62. Id. at 644.
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that if the evidence is borderline as to sufficiency,
the decision should
63
always be made in favor of the defendant.
The Arias decision provides a middle ground as far as the threshold
requirement of evidence is concerned. By allowing instructions based on
evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the fact
finder, the court of appeals is ensuring that the criminal defendant receives
a fair trial, without placing unnecessary time constraints on the trial
court.
B. Public Policy Considerations: Reconciling the Interest of the
State, Criminal Defendant and Trial Court
A number of public policy considerations are persuasive for requiring
evidence to be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
fact finder before allowing courts to determine if an instruction should
go to the jury. These public policy considerations are important to the
state, the defendant in a criminal proceeding, and the trial court itself.
By adopting the California court's reasoning in Glenn and Welch, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals has struck an evenhanded and impartial
balance among these interests.
The state has no interest in allowing a criminal defendant to go free
when the defendant is innocent of the higher charged crime, but guilty
of a lesser offense. 4 Furthermore, the state has no interest in acquiring
a conviction when the defendant is innocent of the higher charged crime,
but guilty of a lesser offense, solely because the "jury is unwilling to
acquit where it is satisfied that the defendant has been guilty of some

wrongful conduct.'

'65

A criminal defendant has a legitimate interest in seeing all the evidence
which meets the sufficient evidence requirement go to the jury.6 The
risk of error increases exponentially when the trier of fact is afforded
only the opportunity to convict or acquit. The criminal defendant risks
conviction on the primary offense, although there may be reasonable
doubts in the minds of the triers of fact. 67 This result threatens the
reasonable doubt standard.6 Under the Arias decision, the defendant
would have an opportunity to be convicted or acquitted of a lesser
offense, instead of risking a jury which may choose to convict the
defendant of a greater crime not proven, rather than allow him to "get
away" without a sentence. 69
Neither the minimal standard expressed in the early cases nor the
stricter standard stated in the middle and modern eras appear to be viable
options for the criminal court system. The standard articulated in the

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Glenn, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
Id. at 612-13.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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early cases of allowing any evidence or the slightest evidence was too
lenient. 70 Under such a minimal standard, a criminal defendant might
attempt to convolute the material issues of the case and mislead and
confuse the jury. For example, a whole slew of theories and defenses
could be tossed out to the jury when the defendant merely presents the
slightest bit of evidence barely hinting at that particular theory. Furthermore, by employing this standard, precious court time could be wasted.
Many hours would be spent instructing the jury as to theories or defenses
which were only peripherally brought out in trial. Additionally, the time
taken for jury deliberations could increase. A jury might be compelled
to examine every jury instruction given, even though some are founded
on clearly insufficient evidence. The minimal standard of evidence required
by the slightest evidence test could obstruct the pursuit of truth and
prove highly inefficient.
A more exacting standard could also prove obstructing and inept.
Requiring that the evidence be sufficient to convict the defendant of the
crime charged could often be too strict a standard for the courts to
employ. The jury should be allowed to deliberate on all theories and
defenses presented at trial if they are substantiated in any way by the
evidence. 7 ' This deliberation would facilitate the search for truth. Further,
the higher standard might, in certain circumstances, appropriate an inordinate amount of discretion to the court. In essence, under a strict
standard, the court could weigh the evidence and determine if the defendant could be convicted of that charge, thus taking the decision out
of the hands of the jury.
For example, in State v. Benavidez, the prosecution argued that the
72
more stringent rule was the most reasonable to adopt. The court reasoned
that if any lower standard were applied, and a defendant was convicted
under an instruction given without sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, the court of appeals would be placed in the position of having
to acquit the defendant.7 3 By employing the stricter standard, the decision
would be taken out of the hands of the jury and given to the judge,
is
thus breaking the cardinal rule of jury instruction-that a defendant 74
case.
his
in
arise
entitled to have a jury decide any material issues which
By submitting to the jury an instruction which is capable of raising a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact, the court is prevented
"a gambling hall and becomes a forum for the discovery
from becoming
' 75
of truth.
instruction
The Arias test entitles a criminal defendant to have an 76
Furthertrial.
at
presented
is
evidence
sufficient
offered to the jury if

70. See id.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id.at 611.
See 94 N.M. 706, 708, 616 P.2d 419, 421 (1980).

Id.
State v. Arias, 115 N.M. 93, 96, 847 P.2d 327, 330 (Ct. App. 1993).
Glenn, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 613 (quoting People v. Geiger, 673 P.2d 1303, 1308 (Cal. 1984)).
Arias, 115 N.M. at 95, 847 P.2d at 329.
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more, in determining whether a requested instruction should be submitted,
the trial court must not weigh the evidence but simply decide whether
it is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the fact
7
finder. 1
V. CONCLUSION
In terms of an equitable and fair result, the decision in State v. Arias
was correct in that adoption of any other standard could result in extreme
hardship to criminal defendants and burden the courts with time-consuming jury instructions and lengthy jury deliberations. Basically, the
Arias standard allows submission to a jury of any instruction which is
capable of raising a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact.
Testimony by the defendant alone would generally prove insufficient.
However, if that testimony can be substantiated through other testimony,
past conduct by the parties, or a reasonable and competent explanation
by the defendant himself, the trial court must submit an instruction based
on this evidence. Conversely, if the evidence is minimal and insufficient,
the court need not instruct on its effect.
ALISON I. ARIAS

77. Id.

